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Computing the tax-benefit position of similar "typical" households across countries is a 
method widely used in comparative fiscal- and social policy research. These calculations 
provide convenient summary pictures of certain aspects of tax-benefit systems. They can, 
however, be seriously misleading because they reduce very complex systems to single point 
estimates. Using an integrated European tax-benefit model (EUROMOD), we substitute the 
typical household by a synthetic dataset, which can be used across countries. By varying 
certain important household characteristics (notably income), this dataset captures a much 
larger range of household situations. The calculations performed on this range of households 
not only show the tax-benefit position of many individual households but also demonstrate 
which household characteristics determine taxes and benefits in each country. Hypothetical 
calculations such as those presented here do not exploit the ability of EUROMOD to 
determine the impact of social and fiscal policies on actual populations. Nevertheless, they 
can be a valuable contribution to understanding tax-benefit systems since they allow us to 
separate the effects of tax-benefit rules from those of the population structure. We compute 
and compare disposable incomes for a large range of pre-tax-and-benefit income (so called 
budget constraints) of households in the Benelux countries. Disposable incomes are then 
decomposed to separately show the effects of each simulated tax and transfer payment. Based 
on these results, we illustrate the performance of the three tax-benefit systems in terms of 
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1.   Introduction 
Simplification is an aim that often features prominently in proposals aiming to reform social 
and fiscal policy instruments. Nevertheless, due to the wide range of functions ascribed to 
them and the multitude of interests involved, tax systems and other instruments remain 
inherently complex. This complexity makes international comparisons difficult, especially 
where a large number of countries are involved. Depending on the purpose of the study it is, 
for example, often not sufficient to analyse the tax system in isolation. Institutional diversity 
between countries often requires the adoption of some concept of effective taxation 
encompassing also tax-like payments such as social insurance contributions as well as 
"negative taxes" such as universal or income tested state benefits. It is for these reasons that 
computing tax-benefit positions of similar typical households across countries is a method 
widely used in comparative fiscal- and social policy research (e.g., Commission of the 
European Communities, various years; OECD, 2000; OECD, various years; Nordic Statistical 
Secretariat, various years; Hansen, various years). 
 
These calculations provide easy-to-grasp summary pictures of certain aspects of tax-benefit 
systems. Complementing country-specific information such as the distribution of taxes and 
benefits and their aggregates, they contribute to a better understanding of different tax-benefit 
systems by showing the effects of taxes and transfer payments on similar households in 
different countries. This convenience comes at the price of potentially being seriously 
misleading since very complex systems are reduced to single (or a few) point estimates. 
Single-point calculations, however, “do not reflect the effects of varying income. This is 
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important because [...] ‘income related systems’ have different characteristics when income 
varies.”
2 However, the point made here about income can be extended to all household 
characteristics that play a role in determining taxes and benefits. Even though many of these 
characteristics are of a discrete nature, computing the taxes and benefits for each combination 
of characteristics quickly becomes very time consuming. If one would in addition want to 
extend these calculations to a number of different countries then, for many studies, the only 
feasible alternative is to rely on calculations that are already available. As Hansen (1998) 
points out, “even if some of the limitations concern the APW [Average Production Worker] as 
such, it should not be forgotten that OECD’s APW is the only existing operational framework 
for this kind of international comparison.”
3 Yet, as will become apparent by the type of 
analysis performed in this paper, what has been considered a typical household in one given 
context may not be the appropriate household situation for the research question at hand in 
other studies. 
 
The apparent solution to these drawbacks - computing the tax-benefit position of a wide range 
of households specific to the research question  - has so far been inhibited by the lack of a 
suitable tool to perform conceptually consistent calculations within a reasonable time frame. 
However, a new integrated European tax-benefit microsimulation model, which provides a 
consistent conceptual framework and permits the use of identical household-datasets across 
countries, allows comparable tax-benefit calculations to be performed on any desired number 
of households. In this paper, we use this model to compute a set of budget constraints (i.e., 
disposable incomes as a function of pre-tax-and-benefit incomes) for a range of household 
types in the three Benelux countries. The calculations are performed for the same set of 
households in each country. We believe that this type of presentation of the mechanics of tax-
benefit systems can be used in a multitude of research contexts. In this paper we concentrate 
on a group of households (low-incomes) that is not normally the subject of studies employing 
hypothetical household calculations. We show how this methodology can be used to assess 
the potential of tax-benefit systems to reduce financial poverty. 
 
It should be noted that the simulation results presented here show the immediate effects of 
social and fiscal policy. That is, the calculations show the tax burdens and transfer payments 
that households would experience for a given set of characteristics. Any behavioural 
consequences of these policy instruments do thus not enter the analysis. While such a "static" 
perspective may limit the scope of analysis for certain research questions, the very short-term 
is often the appropriate assessment period. For example, even though longer-term 
considerations are highly relevant when considering ways to reduce poverty, it is the 
immediate income situation that poor households will normally be most concerned about. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The model and the synthetic micro-data are explained in the 
following section. In section 3, the budget constraints of each household type are presented 
and compared across countries. For each household type, we then focus on low-income 
households. The impact of each tax-benefit system on these households is discussed in section 
4. The last section concludes. 
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2.   Methodology and Data 
In order to compare the impact of different tax-benefit systems, we construct a set of synthetic 
households. A European tax-benefit model (EUROMOD) is then used to compute taxes and 
benefits for each of the households enabling us to compute disposable incomes. By plotting 
disposable incomes on pre-tax-benefit incomes, we can construct so-called budget constraints 
and compare them across countries. These graphs show the effects of the tax-benefit system in 
terms of the difference between household incomes before and after taxes and benefits. 
Having computed budget constraints for the various household types, we analyse in more 
detail what determines household disposable incomes. This is done by decomposing total 
income in order to separately show the impact of each individual tax and benefit instrument 
simulated by the model. 
 
The simulations are performed for the three Benelux countries. The synthetic dataset used as 
an input for the tax-benefit calculations consists of five different household types: A single 
"production worker" (PW), a single parent PW with 2 children, a single earner married couple 
with two children, a two-earner married couple with two children and a married couple of 
pensioners. For each household type there are 160 households representing different levels of 
income. Along with income, we vary other characteristics, such as hours of work, 
employment status, housing costs, etc., in an attempt to capture, for each level of income, a 
"typical" household situation. Naturally, all income variables in this synthetic input dataset 
are gross since the purpose of the paper is to compute taxes and benefits based on gross 
incomes and other relevant characteristics. Table 1a provides a detailed account of all 
characteristics relevant for the simulation of taxes and benefits. Note that the first four 
household types are equivalent to those used by the OECD for tax-benefit calculations. 
Instead of focusing on one particular level of income, however, we are able to explore the 
impact of the tax-benefit system at a range of different income levels (subject to assumptions 
made about associated characteristics as spelled out in table 1a). 
 
Even though the five household types do represent a large part of the national populations, we 
are aware that the choice is to some extent arbitrary. For specific types of analyses, different 
household types will be more appropriate. In addition, we are constrained by the scope of our 
model in what types of households we can analyse.
4 Nonetheless, the characteristics of our 
five groups of households do allow us to assess the most important effects of the tax-benefit 
systems considered here. As a result, even if we do not explicitly take into account other 
important household structures (e.g., families with more than two children), many of the 
mechanisms relevant for them (e.g., family benefits) will be illustrated by the analysis of our 
limited number of household types. Yet, in interpreting the results, it is important to 
remember that the limited range of household types falls short of doing justice to the 
heterogeneity of actual populations. 
 
Table 1b provides a summary picture of the relevance of the chosen household types in each 
of the three countries. The top part of the table shows the number of single, single parent, 
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married couple (working age) and married couple (retirement age) households as a proportion 
of the total number of households in each country. An additional column shows the 
composition in terms of these types of the low-income population. We see that the four types 
encompass the majority of households ("Other" households are less than 50% throughout). 
This also holds among low-income households where, with the exception of Belgium, the 
four types represent a significantly larger part of households than for the population as a 
whole. In the lower part of the table, we consider narrower definitions, which more closely 
resemble some of the household types described in table 1a. The numbers illustrate the 
unavoidable disadvantage of tax-benefit calculations based on hypothetical households. The 
more precise the definition the harder it is to capture the situation of households which 
actually exist in the population. This qualification is important in interpreting results from 
hypothetical calculations, including those presented below. The approach used in this paper 
does not solve this problem but, by permitting household characteristics to be varied, provides 
a method for assessing the influence of household characteristics on taxes and benefits. 
 
To compute taxes and benefits for each household represented in the synthetic dataset, we use 
a tax-benefit microsimulation model. National static microsimulation models exist in most 
countries of the EU and the rest of the OECD. However, to explore the effects of taxes and 
benefits in a comparable manner across different European countries, we need a model that 
operates at the European level and permits the use of consistent concepts and definitions. 
EUROMOD is such a model. It provides us with a Europe-wide perspective on social and 
fiscal policies that are implemented at European, national or regional level. It is also designed 
to examine, within a consistent comparative framework, the impact of national policies on 
national populations or the differential impact of co-ordinated European policy on individual 
Member States. Details on EUROMOD can be found in Immervoll et al. (1999). 
 
The simulations are based on the systems of tax and benefit rules current in June 1998. The 
model simulations are of a "static" nature and, as such, do not incorporate behavioural 
responses (such as reduced work-effort) that may result as a consequence of social and fiscal 
policy measures. While incorporating behavioural changes can be a worthwhile exercise, its 
usefulness depends on the questions to be addressed. For example, for the purpose of 
understanding the interactions between different tax-benefit instruments a model, which does 
not mix immediate effects with longer-term behavioural dimensions will often be preferable. 
 
One of the advantages of an integrated European tax-benefit model is that consistent income 
concepts can be used across countries. Since we want to draw household budget constraints, 
we need to compute disposable incomes for a range of pre-tax-benefit incomes ("original 
income"). For household types who earn income through employment, original income 
mainly consists of employment income. However, since we also analyse the effects of the tax-
benefit system on pensioner households, pensions are also a component of original income. 
For these households, we vary pensions to see what role taxes and benefits (other than 
pensions) play in determining disposable incomes of people with different levels of retirement 
income. Table 2a shows the definition of disposable and original income in terms of the 
income concepts used in this exercise. For the present analysis we simulate, for each 
household type and for each level of original income, income taxes, social insurance 
contributions, child benefits and other family benefits, housing benefits and social assistance   5
benefits. For the Netherlands, we also simulate the state pension, which is not contribution 
related and is received by all residents aged 65 and over.
5 
 
3.   Comparing ‘budget constraints’ across countries 
The graphs in figure 1 illustrate the potential of the approach introduced in the previous 
section. For the five household types chosen, we compare the relationship between original 
and disposable income (the budget constraints) in the three Benelux countries. In principle, a 
tax benefit model such as EUROMOD allows these graphs to be produced for an unlimited 
number of household types. Instead of focusing on one APW (the approximate position of an 
APW is indicated by the dashed vertical line in figure 1a) we can compare households of 
varying size and composition and with different levels of original income, with potentially 
very different results. This is documented by the results for our five household types 
presented in figures 1a to 1e. In these figures, the main focus is on cross-country comparison. 
Contrary to the country specific graphs 2-4, where "official" Euro exchange rates are used, we 




Since figures 1a-1e plot income after taxes and benefits (disposable income) against pre-tax 
and benefit income (original income), they also provide a useful picture of effective tax rates. 
For each household, the net taxes (income taxes plus social insurance contributions minus 
benefits) are equal to the vertical distance of disposable income from the 45-degree line. 
Households with disposable incomes above this line are net benefit recipients while those 
below are net taxpayers. By relating this distance to original income, the average effective tax 
rate (AETR) can be found. The marginal effective tax rate (METR) is represented by the 
slope of the (imaginary) line connecting the disposable incomes of two households, the 
difference in original income between those households being the "margin".
7 The METR is 
zero if this slope is 45 degrees and 100% if it is horizontal. A negative slope represents 
METRs in excess of 100%. 
 
We see that AETRs in Luxembourg are clearly the lowest among the three countries. The 
difference is very substantial for all household types except the pensioner couple where, for 
higher levels of original income, Dutch AETRs are similar. For all other household types, 
AETRs in Belgium and the Netherlands are remarkably similar with the Netherlands showing 
marginally lower METRs (steeper budget constraints) than Belgium. With the exception of 
the single parent household, Luxembourg also has the lowest METRs of all three countries. 
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We also see several interesting kinks in the budget constraints. Most of them occur at low 
levels of income where benefit withdrawal rates often cause METRs to be 100% (the 
exception is Luxembourg). In addition, the phase-out of certain benefits (notably housing 
benefits) sometimes lead to METRs in excess of 100% giving rise to so-called poverty traps 
with strong dis-incentives against increasing earnings above a certain level. 
 
We will now take a closer look at the budget constraints of each of the five household types. 
Starting with single persons (figure 1a), we find that for original incomes of about 200 to 
2,800 Euro per month, disposable incomes in Belgium and the Netherlands are approximately 
the same, while one person households in Luxembourg are clearly better off. At very low 
income levels, single persons in Belgium appear to be worse off than in the Netherlands, and 
the same holds at income levels above about 2,800 Euro. It is important to note that the latter 
is partly caused by the fact that in the Netherlands persons with high incomes do not have to 
pay statutory health insurance contributions. In the results presented here, we only deduct 
compulsory payments (taxes and contributions) from disposable income.
8 Hence, any private 
health insurance premiums paid by the Dutch are not taken into account. Another interesting 
phenomenon is that Dutch households on low incomes (less than about 800 Euro per month) 
all end up with the same level of disposable income, i.e., the METR is 100%. While in 
Belgium, this rate is also 100% except at very low income levels, the budget constraint in 
Luxembourg is slightly upwards sloping (METR < 100%). 
 
The graph for single parent families (figure 1b) confirms the picture that the tax-benefit 
system leaves households in Luxembourg with higher disposable incomes than in Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Similar to one person households, the Dutch take up an intermediate 
position at high income levels, while at low income levels, Belgian single parent families now 
end up with markedly higher disposable incomes than their Dutch counterparts. Among the 
factors leading to these observations are fairly generous amounts of child benefits received by 
Belgian low-income single parents, and the favourable tax treatment of working single parents 
with children younger than 12 in the Netherlands. These features of the Belgian and Dutch 
tax-benefit systems are also reflected in the numbers of single parent households in table 1b. 
In Belgium, we see the lowest number of "low-income" single parent households. The 
favourable tax treatment of Dutch single parents, on the other hand, can only be fully 
exploited by higher income single parents (see section 4.2.2). As a result, these tax advantages 
do not benefit low-income single parents who, in the Netherlands, make up a very large part 
of the low-income population. 
 
For single earner couples with two children (figure 1c), the picture is somewhat different: the 
lines for Belgium and the Netherlands are quite close, especially at high income levels, and 
show the largest differences at the lowest income levels, where Belgian households are clearly 
worse off. Disposable incomes of households with similar levels of original income in 
Luxembourg are again clearly higher, so much so that in Luxembourg a single earner with 
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two children becomes a net payer of taxes and contributions only with original income 
exceeding 3,300 Euro per month, while in Belgium and the Netherlands households become 
net payers with original incomes of less than half this amount. 
 
For two-earner couples with two children the picture (figure 1d) is rather similar to that of 
one-earner families, with Belgian and Dutch households ending up in very similar positions 
and Luxembourg households having clearly higher disposable incomes on the basis of the 
same original income. The main exception to this similarity between figure 1c and 1d 
concerns the comparison of Belgian and Dutch households with low original incomes. With 
original incomes between about 300 and 1,700 Euro, the disposable income of two-earner 
Belgian families appears to be approximately equal to that of comparable Dutch families, and, 
at very low levels of original income, noticeably higher than that of Belgian single-earner 
families with similar original incomes. 
 
Graph 1e shows that in the case of pensioner couples, incomes of Luxembourg households are 
no longer clearly higher than those of their Belgian and Dutch counterparts. In fact, Dutch and 
Luxembourg pensioner families with the same original incomes are almost equally well off in 
terms of disposable incomes, except at levels of original incomes between approximately 
1,250 and 1,800 Euro where Dutch households end up with disposable incomes quite close to 
Belgian pensioners. Below and above this income range, Belgian pensioners have the lowest 
levels of disposable income of the three countries. It should be noted that the Dutch curve is 
not drawn for original incomes below 1,250 Euro because virtually all Dutch pensioners (all 
residents aged 65+) receive the flat rate state pension (which is, as all pensions, included in 
original income). 
 
Clearly, we see different characteristics of the tax-benefit systems depending on the level of 
original income and the household type in question. By producing comparable results for 
many different levels of original income, the graphs are particularly useful for comparing 
important income related features of tax-benefit systems across countries which cannot be 
captured using traditional APW results. For example, the slope of the curves and their 
distance from the 45-degree line provide a quick and comprehensive picture of marginal and 
average effective tax rates. In the next section, we extend the analysis by evaluating which 
tax-benefit instruments are responsible for shaping the budget constraints discussed above. In 
particular, we will analyse the tax-benefit position of the five different household types at low 
levels of original income. The goal here is to compare the potential of the three countries’ tax-
benefit systems to provide a minimum level of financial security for low-income households.  
 
4.   Tax-benefit systems and low-income households 
In this section we show to what extent the tax-benefit systems in the three Benelux countries 
can be seen to be devised with the purpose of ensuring a minimum income level for low-
income households. To this end, we present graphs 2 to 4, which provide a detailed picture of 
the various income components. Focusing on the lower range of original income, they 
decompose disposable incomes into original income, taxes, contributions and various 
benefits. Since the majority of instruments relevant for low-income households are simulated 
in EUROMOD, the mechanics of the tax-benefit system relevant for this income group are   8
well captured by these graphs (see section 2 for details on which instruments are simulated by 
EUROMOD). 
 
We use a national poverty line in each of the countries as a reference income level for 
identifying ‘low-income’ households. The poverty thresholds relevant for each type of 
household are shown in the graphs (dashed line). They are calculated on the basis of 60% of 
median per-capita income as described in table 2b. As before, both original and disposable 
incomes are displayed in the graphs. In reading the graphs, note that since the horizontal axis 
is original income, the horizontal position (the 'x-value') of each bar is the same as the value 
of original income in that bar. As hinted above, we now use market exchange rates to convert 
national currencies into the Euro amounts shown in the graphs.
9 
 
Complementing the graphs, tables 3a to 3d show the components of household income as a 
fraction of disposable income for four different extents of "low income": households with 
disposable incomes equal to the poverty line and households with original incomes of 
approximately 1/1, 2/3 and 1/3 of the national poverty lines. These tables thus provide 
information on how the tax-benefit system affects people experiencing different extents of 
financial poverty. 
 
4.1.   Belgium 
The evidence of recent poverty headcounts in Belgium points to an increase during the years 
preceding 1998 (CSB, 1999; Cantillon et al., 1994; Gevers and van Kerm, 1998; Delhausse 
and Perelman, 1998). The Belgian tax-benefit system plays a very important role in reducing 
poverty rates. For example, Förster and Pellizzari (2000) find that while, in the mid-1990s, the 
poverty rate before taxes and benefits was the third-highest in a sample of 14 OECD 
countries, after taxes and transfer payments only four of these countries had a poverty rate 
lower than Belgium. It is therefore interesting to investigate how the tax-benefit system 
achieves this performance. 
 
4.1.1.  Single persons (working age) 
While no housing cash benefits comparable to the systems in Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands exist in Belgium, families with low original incomes receive social assistance 
("Minimex"). For single persons who receive it, the amount of this benefit is sufficient to 
ensure a disposable income above the poverty line once original income reaches about 120 
Euro (figure 2a). Below that amount disposable income is below the poverty line (613.8 
Euro). In table 1b, we see that persons of working age living alone make up a smaller 
proportion of the "low income" population than in the Netherlands or Luxembourg. However, 
the share among "low income" households is still higher than the share in the population 
overall. Since, similar to our hypothetical calculations, the numbers in table 1b also assume 
that everybody entitled to a benefit does in fact claim it, it must therefore be the case that a 
substantial number of single households have no or only very little income other than benefits 
(in which case Minimex is not sufficient to move them across the poverty threshold). 
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low-income thresholds in national terms. In particular, we are interested in the income situation of low-income 
households relative to national concepts of low income or financial poverty. The cash amounts of each tax-
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Minimex is a supplementary (or "top-up") benefit: it is reduced by the amount of any earned 
income. However, in order to promote the professional re-integration part of the earned 
income is not taken into account in computing the Minimex amount. This is the reason why 
the budget constraint is upwards sloping (until the point - at around 240 Euro - where original 
income exceeds the exempted amount). From this point onwards, the amount of social 
assistance decreases, keeping disposable income constant (and the budget constraint flat). 
Persons with original income between 240 and 870 Euro end up with similar disposable 
incomes close to but above the poverty line (718 Euro or about 117% of the poverty line). 
 
4.1.2.  Single parent families 
Single parent households with low original incomes (figure 2b) are entitled to social 
assistance and to "guaranteed" family benefits. The "guaranteed" family benefit is one of 
several family benefit regimes. The employment status of the claimant (the father by default) 
determines which of the regimes is relevant for the family. "Guaranteed" family benefits are 
available if the claimant works less than 20 hours per week and if the family income does not 
exceed certain limits. In our analysis, only the working hours condition is relevant since all 
low-income households are below the income limits. 
 
Table 3 reveals that these families receive between 19% and 25% of their disposable incomes 
in the form of family benefits. If received, the generous level of these benefits causes 
disposable incomes for this household type to be markedly higher than the poverty line at all 
levels of original income. Relative to the poverty line, low-income single parents in Belgium 
achieve the best position of all household types and country scenarios studies here. At the 
point where the budget constraint flattens out, disposable income is approximately 50% above 
the poverty threshold. It is important, however, to keep in mind that in order to construct the 
graphs, we have assumed that single parents receive alimony payments for their children 
(which is why the lowest original income in figure 2b is about 330 Euro). Since these 
payments are included in original and disposable income but (unlike in the other two 
countries) not in the ‘means’ relevant for computing social assistance, Minimex payments are 
unaffected by the receipt of these payments. Yet, while receipt of maintenance payments is 
fairly common for single parent households, it is not universal. As a result, some single parent 
households with very low incomes may, even if in receipt of social assistance and family 
benefits, fall just below the poverty line. Despite this qualification and keeping in mind that 
benefit non-take up is likely to be an important issue, the results of our hypothetical 
calculations tend to be confirmed by table 1b.
10 We see that despite the largest number of 
single parents overall (5.1% of all households), single parents in Belgium make up a much 
smaller proportion of the poor population (3.0%) than in the other two countries. 
 
One noteworthy feature of the budget constraint is the sudden drop in disposable income at a 
level of original income of about 900 Euro. As hinted above, this is due to the transition from 
the more generous "guaranteed" family benefit to "ordinary" family benefit. This transition is, 
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Results may therefore be affected to the extent that people do not in fact claim benefits which they are entitled to 
(i.e., if single parents do not "take up" social assistance benefits, more such households will be affected by "low 
incomes" than the 3% in table 1b would indicate).   10
in fact, not triggered by the level of original income but by the number of working hours 
(which, in our model families, increase in line with earnings; see table 1a). Since after this 
drop the budget constraint is, again, flat (up to the point where the household is no longer 
eligible for social assistance), it takes a considerable increase in original income (to 1,470 
Euro) in order to regain the same level of disposable income as before the ‘drop’. This large 
increase is necessary since, once incomes become taxable, disposable incomes rise rather 
slowly because of higher marginal tax and contribution rates (they sum up to about 46%) than 
in the other two countries. 
 
4.1.3.  Single earner and two-earner married couples with two children 
As the graphs relating to these two household types (figures 2c and d) have similar 
characteristics, we comment on them together (where comments or amounts are different for 
the two household types, the ones in brackets relate to the two-earner family). In the two-
earner family, the wife is assumed to earn 33% of the husband. Note that, as a result, the scale 
on the original income axis is different in each of the two figures because earnings for the 
two-earner family grow increase at a faster rate (30 + 30/3 = 40 Euro increments) than in the 
single earner case (30 Euro increments). 
 
For very low original incomes, we see the same upward sloping budget constraint as for the 
previous household types. However, disposable incomes stay below (slightly above) the 
poverty line even in the ‘flat’ section of the budget constraint. Recipients of social assistance 
have disposable incomes of between only 81% and 95% (106%) of the poverty threshold. 
Given the much better position of single parent families discussed above, it appears that the 
equivalence scale implicit in the Belgian Minimex benefit puts, in relation to the OECD 
equivalence scale used for computing the poverty line, much too little weight on the second 
adult in a household. This finding is worth emphasising since, usually, the modified OECD 
scale gives similar or lower weights to additional household members than many national 
social assistance schemes. Despite being closer to the poverty threshold than single parents, 
however, the last column of table 3 shows that, relative to the poverty line, Belgian low-
income families with children still tend to be better off than their Dutch and Luxembourg 
counterparts. 
 
As was the case for the single parent household, there is a ‘drop’ in disposable income at the 
point where earned income exceeds the upper income limit of the ‘guaranteed’ family benefit 
(see explanations above). To make up for that drop, the original income has to rise to more 
than 1,110 (1,300) Euro, an increase of 480 (520) Euro. The difference is due to the different 
tax treatment of one- and two earner couples. On one hand, two earner couples are at an 
advantage due to an earnings related deduction (with a regressive rate structure) which is 
supposed to cover any work-related expenses. On the other hand, one earner couples and 
couples where one partner earns less than 30% of the couple's earnings benefit from a transfer 
of taxable income from the higher to the lower earning spouse. Since the tax system in 
Belgium is one of individual taxation, any transfer of taxable income from the higher to the 
lower earning partner reduces the couple’s overall average tax rate. 
 
In the two-earner family explored in figure 2d, the lower earning spouse earns 25% of the 
couple’s overall earnings (1/3 divided by 1+1/3) and, as a result, still benefits from a small   11
transfer which is, however, clearly smaller than in the one-earner case. Despite this 
disadvantage the two-earner family still ends up with lower tax burdens for a given level of 
original income since the earnings related deduction more than compensates for the difference 
in earnings transfers (at least for the levels of original income shown in the graphs). 
 
Turning to table 3, we see that single earner (PW, 0SP, 2ch) families are generally worse off 
than two-earner (PW, 33SP, 2ch) families. The social assistance benefit is unable to lift single 
earner families with very low original incomes out of poverty (bottom two tables).
11 Another 
noteworthy feature is the large difference between single- and double earner families in the 
case where disposable income is equal to the poverty threshold (first table). The poverty cut-
off is first reached with original income of about 1,170 Euro in the single earner family while 
in the two-earner case, the same disposable income is achieved with original income of only 
340 Euro. Inspection of the relevant graphs (figures 2c and 2d), however, reveals that this 
enormous difference is caused by small differences in the benefit amounts.
12 These are 
magnified by the flatness of the relevant section of the budget constraints and their proximity 
to the poverty threshold. 
 
4.1.4. Pensioner  couples 
Our hypothetical tax-benefit calculations in figure 2e indicate that, similar to other households 
with more than one adult, pensioner couples receiving social assistance face a high risk of 
poverty and the household composition of the actual Belgian population confirms that this is 
indeed the case (table 1b). As for the single earner family in figure 2c, the amounts of social 
assistance are again not sufficient for lifting low-income households out of poverty. 
Disposable incomes of this group of pensioner couples are only 81% to 92% of the poverty 
threshold. Compared to working-age couples, however, fewer pensioner couples whose 
income is too high to still be eligible for social assistance, are ‘poor’. This is due to the fact 
that before liability to pay income tax kicks in at an original income of about 1,250 Euro, no 
social insurance contributions are payable either. As a result, disposable incomes increase one 
for one with original income (as illustrated by the budget constrain being parallel to and, 
indeed, identical with, the 45 degree line). 
 
Another feature of graph 2e is the slight drop in disposable income at an original income of 
about 2,260 Euro which coincides with an increase of the marginal effective tax rate 40% to 
over 51%. Both phenomena can be explained by the availability of an income tested income 
tax reduction available (in the form of a tax credit) for replacement incomes. 
 
Table 3 reveals that for cases where disposable income or original income is equal to the 
poverty line (top two tables) the tax-benefit system does not have any impact on pensioner 
                                                         
11 A larger part of the two-earner family’s "resources" is disregarded for the purpose of computing the social 
assistance top-up benefit (Minimex): Each earner can claim a so-called "professional integration bonus" which 
basically allows benefit recipients to increase their earnings (up to a certain limit) during the first three years of a 
new job without reducing their benefit levels. Hence, for a given level of household earnings, social assistance 
benefits are higher for the two-earner family. 
12 In addition to the differences in the social assistance benefit, the "drop" in family benefits caused by the 
transition from "guaranteed" to "ordinary" benefit occurs at different levels of original income for the single- and 
two-earner families (because it only depends on the working hours of the claimant; see the discussion in section 
4.1.2).   12
couples’ disposable incomes (row Pen, 33Pen). In the cases of the very low-income 
households (bottom two tables), the only influence is through social assistance. 
 
4.2.   The Netherlands 
Among the member countries of the European Union, the Netherlands is usually found to 
have fairly low poverty rates (see e.g., Hagenaars et al., 1994; Eurostat, 2000) which is 
confirmed by the poverty figures we derived using EUROMOD (table 2b). However, looking 
at the actual Dutch population by household type (table 1b), we find that one person 
households and single parents are particularly likely to end up with incomes below the 
poverty threshold: Their share of the "low income" population is markedly higher than of the 
population as a whole. 
 
4.2.1.   Single persons (working age) 
Dutch transfer payments fail to lift single persons with low original incomes out of poverty. 
Original income is supplemented by social assistance such that after deduction of income 
taxes and employee social insurance contributions the resulting ‘social minimum’ is 
approximately equal to 70% of the net minimum wage. Even if all people entitled to social 
assistance would in fact claim it, we see that their disposable incomes do not exceed our low-
income cut-off (figure 3a). In addition, the person may be entitled to housing benefits ("rent 
subsidy") of which the level depends on the gross rent and net income including social 
assistance. Given the assumptions on the gross monthly rent (see table 1a), the resulting 
housing benefit is almost negligible. All in all, disposable income for single persons with low 
original incomes is, on a monthly basis, about 20 Euro below the poverty line relevant for 
single persons. It should be noted that the full social assistance amounts are only awarded to 
single persons living alone (i.e. not ‘sharing their front door’) aged 21 or more, who are not in 
full-time education and not self-employed. Eligibility also depends upon being "sufficiently 
active" in looking for work. While all these conditions are assumed to be satisfied here this is 
will clearly often not be so in reality. Moreover, except for persons having never worked, 
social assistance entitlement often starts once entitlement to other benefits (such as 
unemployment benefits) expires. Since none of these benefits are received by any of our 
model households, they have not been taken into account in the calculations. 
 
It can be seen from figure 3a and from table 3 that, unlike in any of the other countries, single 
persons on social assistance already pay considerable amounts of income tax, and in 
particular, social insurance contributions (summing to a level of more than 25% of disposable 
income). Similar to earnings, where any taxes and contributions are normally withheld by the 
employer, social assistance is also paid out as a net amount, in addition to which the 
municipalities pay taxes and contributions to the relevant authorities. 
 
4.2.2.   Single parent families 
In the Netherlands, low-income single parent households are entitled to benefits which lift 
disposable incomes above the poverty line assumed to be relevant for this household type 
(figure 3b). In addition to social assistance which, in the case of single parents, supplements 
disposable income to about 90% of the net minimum wage, these households are entitled to 
flat rate child benefits, as well as to housing benefits. However, housing benefits, and thus the 
housing related assumptions in our model households, do play a decisive role. Without rent   13
subsidy, disposable incomes of low-income households collapse below the poverty line. Other 
assumptions on the rent would lead to the conclusion that single earners with two children are 
guaranteed disposable incomes higher or lower than the poverty line relevant for their 
household type (obviously, the same holds if the poverty line would be computed on a 
different basis). This is one important factor explaining why table 1b shows single parent 
households making up a much larger proportion of "low-income" households than figure 3b 
would suggest. Other reasons why single parents will frequently be less well off than the 
model family in figure 3b are that self-employed persons are not eligible to receive regular 
social assistance (although they may be eligible for a different benefit) and a relatively 
stringent capital test which prevents single parents from receiving social assistance if the 
value of any assets exceeds about 4,400 Euro. 
 
As mentioned in section 3, single parent families with children younger than 12 benefit from a 
relatively generous tax free allowance at higher income levels. It should be noted that higher 
income single parents would be even better off if the costs of childcare (which in the 
Netherlands is rather heavily subsidised and/or tax deductible) would be taken into account. 
The generous tax free allowances (also relevant for computing the base of most social 
insurance contributions) are also visible in tables 2b-d where we see that single parents with 
low incomes do not pay income tax and a very limited amount of social insurance 
contributions. 
 
4.2.3.   Single earner married couples with two children 
In terms of the generosity of transfer payments, low income single parents are, relative to the 
poverty threshold, better off than couples with children (figure 1c, 1d). In essence, this is a 
consequence of the fact that the Dutch tax-benefit system assumes that single parent families 
with two children require more than 90% of the resources of couples with two children (90% 
of social assistance + 100% of child benefits + 100% of rent subsidy) to reach the same 
welfare level, whilst the modified OECD scale on which the poverty line is based assumes 
that single parent households with two children need 76% (1.6 divided by 2.1) of the 
resources of couples with two children. 
 
In our simulations, low income single earner couples with two children end up with a level of 
disposable income which is about 150 Euro below the poverty line. In addition to social 
assistance, which, for couples with children, supplements disposable income to about 100% 
of the net minimum wage, these households receive the same flat rate child benefits as single 
parent families, as well as housing benefits. 
 
For low-income couples with two children, child benefits account for about 12% of 
disposable income. Income taxes and social insurance contributions sum to approximately the 
same fraction, which puts them about halfway between the very low tax and contribution 
burden we saw for single parents and the fairly high percentage for single persons. This is a 
direct result of the different tax free allowances (pertaining to income tax and part of the 
employee social insurance contributions) available for the various household types. 
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4.2.4.   Two earner married couples with two children 
While higher income two-earner households benefit from slightly more favourable tax and 
contribution rules
13 than single earner couples, these differences are not relevant for 
households receiving social assistance. As a result, essentially the same results are found as 
for single earner couples, basically because for social assistance it makes no difference 
whether one or two earners are active to earn original income. In fact, it is clear that given the 
100% claw-back of social assistance for every additional Euro earned, households receiving 
social assistance do not have a strong incentive to marginally increase their labour supply. 
Their disposable income would only increase if they increased their earnings to well above 
the minimum wage. It should be noted that municipalities in the Netherlands have some legal 
opportunities not to apply the full 100% claw-back rate for selected groups of households. 
They can also award certain lump-sum benefits to persons who stop receiving social 
assistance after accepting a job offer. 
 
4.2.5. Pensioner  couples 
Essentially, the flat rate state pension guarantees an income level slightly higher than the 
‘social minimum’ or social assistance level, which for this household type is higher than the 
poverty line (figure 3e). Note that, since pensions are included in original income, this means 
that the latter is always above the poverty threshold. As in the other two countries, social 
insurance contributions are markedly lower for pensioners than people of working age. In the 
Netherlands, compulsory contributions decrease further once original income exceeds 1,640 
Euro. At this point, we see a kink in the budget constraint because health insurance 
contributions are no longer compulsory. (A similar upper contribution threshold exists for 
working age individuals albeit at a higher income level. See section 3 and in particular 
footnote 8.) 
 
4.3.   Luxembourg 
While we find a relatively small number of households living in poverty (table 2b), analysis 
of recent Luxembourg specific income micro-data (Socio-Economic Panel Living In 
Luxembourg, CEPS/Instead) shows that the previous years have seen small but steady year-
on-year increases of the number of households with disposable incomes below the poverty 
threshold as defined before. Between 1995 and 1998, the overall increase was 1.5 percentage 
points. Looking more closely at households in poverty (table 1b), we find particularly high 
rates among single parent families, one person households (working age) and single-earner 
families with children. 
 
4.3.1.   Single persons (working age) 
As shown in figure 4a, benefits fail to lift low income single persons of working age across 
the poverty line. However, while the shortfall is about 200 Euro for those with no original 
income, those with some original income benefit from a withdrawal rate of less than 100%. 
This is in contrast with both Belgium and the Netherlands where budget constraints of social 
assistance recipients are mostly flat. Apart from social assistance ("Revenu Minimum 
Garanti", RMG), housing benefits play an important role in supplementing single persons’ 
disposable incomes (subject, again, to the assumptions made about rent expenses – see table 
1a). Income taxes are not payable as long as original income of a single person remains below 
                                                         
13 Spouses with low or zero incomes can transfer their tax free allowance to the higher earning spouse.   15
1,180 Euro – exactly the income level where single households manage to cross the poverty 
threshold. Social insurance contributions (2.55% of income from social assistance and 
13.05% of any income from employment) are payable at all income levels. The overall 
reduction of disposable incomes of poor persons by these payments is, however, much lower 
than in the Netherlands (and comparable in size to Belgium). 
 
The amount of social assistance depends on household size and composition and on 
household gross income. This income concept excludes many transfer payments such as 
family benefits. In addition, up to 20% of earnings and replacement incomes are excluded. 
This disregard of a part of the professional and replacement incomes in computing the 
"means" is the reason why the budget constraint is upwards sloping for recipients of social 
assistance: Social assistance benefits are withdrawn at 80% as earnings increase, leaving 20% 
of any additional income as an incentive to take up low-paid jobs or increase hours worked. 
Housing benefits are conditional upon receiving social assistance. The amount of the housing 
benefit is determined as the difference between the rent paid and the amount corresponding to 
10% of the maximum social assistance amount with an upper limit of about 123 Euro.
14 The 
fact that housing benefits are tied to social assistance explains the sudden drop  in the budget 
constraint at the point where households stop receiving the latter. By causing marginal 
effective tax rates well in excess of 100%, this discontinuity is, at certain income levels, the 
source of a potential "poverty trap" where there are strong disincentives to increase earnings 
beyond a certain level. 
 
It is important to note that social assistance may not be available to a substantial proportion of 
single households. Those who are not eligible include persons younger than 30, those who 
have spent less than 10 years in Luxembourg and those with capital exceeding certain capital 
limits. In addition to the amounts which, as discussed above, are insufficient to lift single 
households out of poverty, these factors explain the relatively high fraction of one person 
households among the "low income" population (table 1b). Similar observations can also be 
made about the next household type. 
 
4.3.2.   Single parent families 
As in the Dutch case, figure 4b shows single parents always above the poverty line despite the 
fact that table 1b has identified them as a groups facing very high risks of poverty. Also 
similar to the Netherlands, housing benefits do play an important role. As a result, different 
housing-related characteristics of the model family may lead to incomes being below or very 
close to the poverty line. (While in the Dutch case, different assumptions may lead to lower as 
well as higher rent subsidies, the level of housing benefits shown in figure 4b are already at 
their maximum.) Social assistance is also subject to several conditions which a substantial 
number of single parents may not satisfy (see section 4.3.1 above). 
 
The generosity of family benefits is similar to Belgium (table 3). Family benefits provide 
about 19% of the income of low-income single parents with two children. For very low 
incomes, however, Luxembourg single parents are not as well-off as their counter parts in 
Belgium where the "Guaranteed" family benefits regime provides up to 23% of total income 
                                                         
14 Since the maximum social assistance amount is a function of household size and composition, this is also true 
for housing benefits.   16
(bottom table). On the tax and contribution side, a similar remark can be made as for the 
single person household type. Here, income becomes taxable once original income reaches a 
level of about 2,500 Euro. 
 
4.3.3.  Single earner married couples with two children 
Compared to the single parent household type, social assistance does not increase sufficiently 
to make up for the higher poverty threshold (+31% vis-à-vis single parents in terms of 
unadjusted household income), resulting from the equivalence scale used (figure 4c).
15 The 
maximum amount for social assistance (i.e., before the subtraction of any "means") is, in fact, 
40% higher than the maximum amount in the single parent case. The actual social assistance 
payment is, nevertheless, lower relative to the poverty line since family and housing benefits, 
which are not included in the "means", are the same as in the single parent case (housing 
benefits are unchanged because, given the assumptions made about rent, housing benefits 
reach their allowable maximum of 123 Euro in all cases). As a result, low-income single 
earner couples with two children end up with disposable incomes that are between 345 and 
145 Euro below the poverty line. 
 
4.3.4.  Two earner married couples with two children 
In Luxembourg, married couples pay income taxes on a joint basis. As a result, income taxes 
are the same regardless whether income is earned by one or both spouses.  The same holds for 
social assistance, which is computed on the basis of income earned at the household level. 
Social insurance contributions, however, are individual based and not proportional (as is 
common, they are subject upper contribution limits). As a result, high income single earner 
couples will, for a given level of earnings, pay less contributions than double earners. For the 
income ranges analysed here, however, social insurance contribution schedules are 
proportional. Comparison of figures 4c and 4d therefore shows that, for a given level of total 
original income, two earner couples end up with exactly the same disposable incomes as 
single earner couples. 
 
A similar picture emerges from table 3. In all four cases we see that the different components 
are exactly the same regardless whether income is earned by both spouses (PW, 33SP, 2ch) or 
only one (PW, 33SP, 2ch).  
 
4.3.5. Pensioner  couples 
The social assistance system in Luxembourg does not distinguish between pensioners and 
non-pensioners: Any replacement incomes are treated exactly the same as earnings. As a 
result, the social assistance amounts shown in figure 4e apply for any married or cohabiting 
couple, whether pensioner or not. For low-income couples, the only elements of the tax-
benefit system which distinguish between pensioners and earners of employment/self-
employment incomes are social insurance contributions. Pensioners only contribute to health 
insurance (2.55%) while blue-collar workers pay for health insurance (5.05%)
16 and for 
pension assurance (8%). 
 
                                                         
15 The modified OECD scale assumes 1.6 (1+0.3+0.3) adult equivalents for the single parent household while for 
the couple with two children the adjustment factor is 2.1 (1+0.5+0.3+0.3). 
16 The rate for white collar workers is 2.7% (all figures for 1998).   17
5.   Summary and Conclusion 
We have used a new European tax-benefit model to produce detailed tax-benefit calculations 
on a set of synthetic households in the three Benelux countries. Similar to "Average 
Production Worker"-type calculations, we use household definitions which are consistent 
across countries. Rather than providing a single (or a few) point estimates, however, we vary 
income and related characteristics for each household type and are thus able to derive so 
called "budget constraints" which are comparable across countries. In a second step, we take a 
closer look at the different components of each country’s tax-benefit system, unpicking the 
effects of each type of instrument on households’ disposable incomes. Lastly, we analyse 
these effects focusing in particular on low-income households in order to gain an 
understanding of the performance of each tax-benefit system in securing minimum levels of 
income. 
 
As we have shown, it is clearly important to carefully delineate the effects of various parts of 
the tax-benefit system and their interactions in order to be able to address issues that call for 
reforms. However, it is equally important to keep in mind that not all relevant features of tax-
benefit systems can be shown using hypothetical calculations. For example, while failing to 
protect all household types from financial poverty, the tax-benefit systems in the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg ensure that the household types considered here always have disposable 
incomes that are above 80% (and often 100%) of the poverty line. Yet there are, of course, 
some important reasons why, in looking at actual poverty statistics, we find substantial 
poverty rates and households with incomes much below minimum incomes provided by the 
social assistance schemes analysed in this paper. 
 
1.  Certain categories of households are not entitled to social assistance. Moreover, for some 
households (young people, etc.), social assistance amounts are lower than in the cases 
analysed here. In Luxembourg, applicants must be ‘available’ for work and accept an 
appropriate employment assigned to them by the labour authorities (except for old, sick or 
disabled persons or persons who are looking after a child or a disabled person). In 
addition, they must be at least 30 years of age (does not apply to persons ‘unable’ to work 
and those looking after a child or a disabled person) and must have been resident in 
Luxembourg for at least 10 of the last 20 years.
17 
2.  Non-take up of social assistance. Especially households who would be entitled to small 
amounts of social assistance next to other sources of income are likely not to bother with 
the application procedure. 
3.  As mentioned above, especially for couples with children, the amount of rent subsidy may 
be lower, causing disposable income for households receiving social assistance to fall 
below the poverty line.  
4.  The measurement of income can be subject to errors. Measurement errors inherent in the 
data source underlying our calculation of poverty lines may have caused us to compute 
poverty lines which are either too high or too low. When incomes are close to the poverty 
threshold, the statistics may be rather sensitive to the exact location of the poverty line. 
 
With these qualifications in mind, several conclusions can be drawn from our study. 
                                                         
17 Note that some of these rules have been relaxed in 2000. The age limit has been reduced from 30 years to 25 
and, for EU citizens, residence conditions do no longer apply.   18
 
The existing EU-wide tax-benefit model permits quick and informative comparisons to be 
made. By using a single synthetic dataset across different countries, we can vary any 
household characteristic of interest and explore the sensitivity of taxes and benefits to changes 
in this characteristic in each country. If the characteristic which is varied is income, we obtain 
easy to grasp "budget constraints" which, among other things, provide an intuitive picture of 
effective average and marginal tax rates and are able to reveal potential "anomalies" (e.g., 
poverty traps) caused by interactions of interrelated tax and benefit rules. 
 
In the simulations underlying the analysis of the present paper, we focus on the role of tax-
benefit systems in the Benelux countries in providing a minimum level of financial security 
for low-income households. We find that in all three countries, the systems of taxes and 
transfer payments ensure that all selected household types have disposable incomes that are 
close enough to the poverty line to render conclusions sensitive to alternative assumptions 
about household characteristics (e.g., the level of housing costs in relation to earnings) or 
definitions of poverty thresholds. The frequent proximity of the poverty line to the minimum 
level of disposable incomes provided by state transfers is particularly interesting. On one 
hand, it highlights the danger of relying on one single poverty line in evaluating tax-benefit 
reforms. We have, for example, illustrated the different importance of components of the tax 
benefit system at different extents of poverty (table 3). Also, the clustering of low-income 
households within a small range of disposable incomes demonstrates the potentially large 
(and misleading) impact on poverty headcounts of making marginal changes to benefit levels. 
We would like to stress that exploring these sensitivities is a strength of the approach 
presented here since household characteristics as well as poverty thresholds can be varied in 
order to see which changes would affect the analysis and which would not. For example, in 
the graphs presented here, the reader can easily evaluate the effect of adopting different 
poverty thresholds. 
 
Hypothetical calculations such as those presented here do not exploit the ability of 
EUROMOD to determine the impact of social and fiscal policies on actual populations. It is 
clear that analysing the impact of tax-benefit systems on hypothetical households, can only be 
part of the story. The ‘real’ situation can only be captured by looking at micro-data which is 
representative of the relevant country’s population. It is, therefore, planned to complement the 
present analysis with empirical work based on the EUROMOD micro-database. Nonetheless, 
the hypothetical calculations provide a focus on the mechanics of the tax-benefit system, 
which cannot be matched by analysing household micro-data. Hypothetical tax-benefit 
calculations allow us to separate the effects of tax-benefit rules from those of the population 
structure. In doing so, they can play an important role not only in international comparisons 
but also in gaining a better-grounded understanding of national fiscal and social policies and 
their potential impact on peoples’ incomes and economic behaviour.   19
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Table 1a. Household types. 
 Adults  Marital 
Status 
Children Age(s) Gender Employment  Status Occupation Earnings  Interest 
Income  




PW  1 single  0  35  m  empl.  blue  x  10  2400  20  0 
PW, 2ch  1 single  2  35/6/12  m/f/m  empl./stud./stud.  blue  x/0/0  10/0/2 2400/0/480  20/0/0  0/150/150 
PW, 0SP, 2ch  2 married  2  35/35/6/12  m/f/f/m  empl./inactive/stud./stud.  blue/n.a.  x/0/0/0 10/10/0/2  2400/2400/0/480  20/20/0/0  0 
PW, 33SP, 2ch  2 married  2  35/35/6/12  m/f/f/m  empl./empl./stud./stud. blue/blue  x/0.33*x/0/0  10/10/0/2  2400/2400/0/480  20/20/0/0  0 
Pen, 33Pen  2  married 0  68/68 m/f pensioner/pensioner n.a./n.a. x/0.33*x 10/10 2400/2400  20/20  0 
Notes:  PW stands for ‘production worker’, SP for spouse and ch for children. All monetary amounts are in Euro per month. x means that for this person, earnings are varied. Depending on the 
employment status, x represents either employment income or pensions. For each household type, x is incremented in steps of 30 Euros. As a result, we get 160 different households in each 
category. For employed people, working hours rise in discrete steps (0, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40) as a function of employment income. They are determined by dividing gross employment income (x) 
by average gross hourly earnings of an APW. The annual income of an APW is taken to be apwY = 26,550 Euro. Persons shown as "employed" have status "inactive" as long as they work no 
more than 5 hours per week. “Inactive” people are assumed not to be eligible for unemployment benefits. For pensioners, x represents state pensions up to 75% of apwY. That part of x which 
exceeds 75% of apwY is ‘earned’ as a private/occupational pension. In the Netherlands, x only consists of private/occupational pension (because the state pension is a flat amount which is paid 
to all residents aged 65 and older and is not related to own earnings). Rented accommodation is assumed throughout. We assume that 20% of total household income is spent on rent. This is 
subject to a minimum which is assumed to be 150 euro for a single household. For the other four household types, a ‘square root of household size’ equivalence scale is used to adjust the 
minimum: Monthly rent = max(150*sqrt(household size), (gross household earnings)/5). Monthly service charges = rent/10. Note that some transfer payments simulated in this paper are quite 
sensitive to the amount of rent paid. Yet, these benefits are only available for low-income households (in which case only the parameters determining our “minimum rent” are relevant). In any 
case, even though we realise that a rent function estimated on micro-data would, if difficult to implement, be methodologically more satisfactory (see, e.g., CPB 1995), the emphasis in this 
paper is on ‘typical’ households which are ‘plausible’ rather than strictly representative of the actual population.  
   21
Table 1b. Country population by household type. 
  BE NL  LU 
household types as a 









(male, <65 or female, <60)  13.1% 15.2%  21.6% 41.7%  14.0%  16.2% 
single  parent  5.1% 3.0%  2.7% 9.6%  3.9%  9.6% 
married couple with children  27.8%  19.6%  24.9%  17.6%  29.2%  33.4% 
married couple  
(both >59, one >64)  11.9% 16.3% 8.9%  7.0% 9.8% 7.4% 
Other 42.1%  45.9%  41.9%  24.1%  43.1%  33.4% 
  100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
            
single  parent,  two  children  1.7% 1.5%  0.9% 3.6%  1.1%  1.9% 
married  couple,  two  children  12.3% 9.7%  12.2% 9.0%  12.7%  12.9% 
one earner married couple  
(both <65), children  9.2% 5.8%  10.1%  10.7%  17.0%  22.7% 
one earner married couple  
(both <65), two children  3.7% 3.8%  5.0% 5.4%  7.6%  8.5% 
two earner married couple  
(both <65), children  15.6% 0.7%  13.3% 2.0%  10.4%  5.8% 
two earner married couple  
(both <65), two children  7.5% 0.2%  6.5% 1.2%  4.7%  2.6% 
Source: EUROMOD. 
Notes: households are "low income" if their income is below 60% of the median adjusted household income. 
Incomes have been adjusted for household size using the "modified" OECD scale (with weights 1 for the first 
adult, 0.5 for further adults and 0.3 for children under 14).   22
Table 2a. Income concepts. 
Disposable Income:  Original Income 
   wages/salaries     wages/salaries 
+ self-employment income *  + self-employment income * 
+ interest income  + interest income 
+ alimony and child maintenance  + alimony and child maintenance 
+ private transfers  + private transfers 
+ occupational/private pension   + occupational/private pension 
+ state pension  + state pension 
+ unemployment benefits *   
+ other cash benefits (universal and social 
assistance benefits) 
 
- social insurance contributions paid by 
the employee or benefit recipient 
 
- income taxes   
* Self-employment income and unemployment benefits are not relevant for any of the 
household types we are looking at since none of the persons in these households is self-
employed or unemployed. The reason why these components are included here is because 
they do enter the disposable income used for determining the poverty lines (table 2b). 
 
 









poverty thresholds by household type 
(household income) 
 
   




BE  613.8 16.2% 14.8%  613.8  920.6  982.0  1,288.9 
NL  683.2 10.7%  9.9%  683.2  1,024.8  1,093.1  1,434.7 
LU  1,074.8 10.9% 11.3%  1,074.8  1,612.3  1,719.7  2,257.1 
Source: EUROMOD. 
Notes: All monetary amounts are in Euro per month. Poverty lines in the left column are 60% of median adjusted 
disposable household income. The equivalence scale used for adjusting household incomes for household size and 
composition is the ‘modified’ OECD scale (see notes to table 1b). Official Euro exchange rates (not PPP adjusted) 
are used for the conversion. Individuals are considered 'poor' if they live in 'poor' households (i.e., in households 
with adjusted incomes below the poverty line). The poverty line in terms of adjusted income has then been 
translated into actual incomes by multiplying with the equivalence scale appropriate for each household type. 
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Table 3. Income components of low-income households. 
 
A. Disposable Income = Poverty Threshold 
























BE  PW  19.1% 0.0%  -1.7% 0.0%  82.6% 0.0% 613.8  100.0% 
  PW, 2ch  n/a (all have disp. income above poverty line)  982.0 100.0% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  91.5% 0.0%  -10.3%  19.5%  0.0% 0.0%  1,288.9  100.0% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  26.6% 0.0%  -2.6%  23.8%  52.2% 0.0%  1,288.9  100.0% 
  Pen, 33Pen  100.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 920.6  100.0% 
NL  PW  n/a (all recipients of SAB have disp.income approx. equal to poverty line)  683.2 100.0% 
  PW, 2ch  n/a (all have disp. income above poverty line)  1,093.1 100.0% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  112.8% -4.2%  -21.3%  10.6%  0.0%  2.3%  1,434.7  100.0% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  103.5% -3.4%  -16.4%  10.6%  0.0%  5.6%  1,434.7  100.0% 
  Pen, 33Pen  105.6% 0.0%  -10.5% 0.0%  0.0% 6.4%  1,024.8  100.0% 
LU  PW  97.6% 0.0%  -10.2% 0.0%  1.5%  11.1%  1,074.8  100.0% 
  PW, 2ch  n/a (all have disp. income above poverty line)  1,719.7 100.0% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  93.7% 0.0%  -9.7%  16.1%  0.0% 0.0%  2,257.1  100.0% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  93.7% 0.0%  -9.7%  16.1%  0.0% 0.0%  2,257.1  100.0% 
  Pen, 33Pen  83.6% 0.0%  -2.3% 0.0%  11.3% 7.7%  1,612.3  100.0% 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
B. Original Income = Poverty Threshold 
























BE  PW  87.8% 0.0%  -10.0% 0.0%  22.6% 0.0% 717.9  117.0% 
  PW, 2ch  68.6% 0.0%  -5.4%  17.3%  19.6% 0.0%  1,446.6  147.3% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  94.6% -2.2%  -10.7%  18.3%  0.0%  0.0%  1,365.3  105.9% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  94.3% -1.7%  -10.7%  18.1%  0.0%  0.0%  1,381.0  107.1% 
  Pen, 33Pen  100.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 900.0  97.8% 
NL  PW  99.6% -4.5%  -21.2%  0.0% 25.9%  0.3%  673.0 98.5% 
  PW, 2ch  81.7% -0.3%  -2.3%  11.3%  0.0%  9.6%  1,339.2  122.5% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  103.3% -3.4%  -17.2%  10.9%  0.0%  6.4%  1,388.3 96.8% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  101.3% -3.2%  -15.5%  10.7%  0.0%  6.7%  1,424.5 99.3% 
  Pen, 33Pen  105.6% -1.4%  -10.5%  0.0%  0.0%  6.4%  1,073.7  104.8% 
LU  PW  111.6% 0.0%  -11.6% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 967.6  90.0% 
  PW, 2ch  89.0% 0.0%  -7.7%  18.7%  0.0% 0.0%  1,924.6  111.9% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  94.7% 0.0%  -9.9%  15.2%  0.0% 0.0%  2,378.0  105.4% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  94.7% 0.0%  -9.9%  15.2%  0.0% 0.0%  2,378.0  105.4% 
  Pen, 33Pen  103.5% -0.9%  -2.5%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  1,565.7 97.1% 
Source: EUROMOD 
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Table 3. Income components of low-income households (cont’d) 
 
C. Original Income = 2/3 Poverty Threshold 
























BE  PW  58.5% 0.0%  -6.5% 0.0%  48.0% 0.0% 717.9  117.0% 
  PW, 2ch  44.1% 0.0%  -2.6%  20.3%  38.2% 0.0%  1,502.0  153.0% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  74.7% 0.0%  -8.3%  21.4%  12.2% 0.0%  1,168.1  90.6% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  65.5% 0.0%  -7.2%  19.0%  22.8% 0.0%  1,316.8  102.2% 
  Pen, 33Pen  74.4% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  25.6% 0.0% 833.1  90.5% 
NL  PW  67.8% -4.7%  -21.9%  0.0% 58.5%  0.3%  673.0 98.5% 
  PW, 2ch  64.0%  0.0%  -1.1% 13.4%  12.5% 11.3%  1,137.1  104.0% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  73.9%  -1.6%  -8.7% 11.9%  12.2% 12.4%  1,280.5  89.3% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  73.9%  -1.6%  -8.7% 11.9%  12.2% 12.4%  1,280.5  89.3% 
  Pen, 33Pen  n/a (due to universal state pension ori. income always above 66% pov. line)    
LU  PW  74.8% 0.0%  -8.3% 0.0%  26.5% 7.1% 963.1  89.6% 
  PW, 2ch  60.6% 0.0%  -5.1%  19.1%  18.8% 6.6%  1,886.0  109.7% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  72.4% 0.0%  -7.7%  17.4%  12.0% 6.0%  2,075.8  92.0% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  72.4% 0.0%  -7.7%  17.4%  12.0% 6.0%  2,075.8  92.0% 
  Pen, 33Pen  69.9% -0.2%  -2.4%  0.0% 26.8%  5.9%  1,516.5 94.1% 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
D. Original Income = 1/3 Poverty Threshold 
























BE  PW  29.7% 0.0%  -3.0% 0.0%  73.3% 0.0% 707.0  115.2% 
  PW, 2ch  25.0% 0.0%  0.0%  23.0%  52.0% 0.0%  1,327.4  135.2% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  34.5% 0.0%  -3.5%  25.0%  44.0% 0.0%  1,223.4  94.9% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  32.4% 0.0%  -3.3%  23.4%  47.5% 0.0%  1,302.7  101.1% 
  Pen, 33Pen  37.4% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  62.6% 0.0% 801.1  87.0% 
NL  PW  31.1% -4.8%  -21.9%  0.0% 93.8%  0.3%  683.2  100.0% 
  PW, 2ch  31.9%  0.0%  -0.7% 13.4%  44.2% 11.3%  1,137.1  104.0% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  38.2%  -1.9%  -9.8% 11.9%  49.4% 12.4%  1,280.5  89.3% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  36.6%  -1.9%  -9.8% 11.9%  50.9% 12.4%  1,280.5  89.3% 
  Pen, 33Pen  n/a (due to universal state pension ori. income always above 33% pov. line)    
LU  PW  39.0% 0.0%  -5.3% 0.0%  58.9% 7.4% 922.3  85.8% 
  PW, 2ch  31.4% 0.0%  -2.5%  19.8%  44.6% 6.8%  1,821.3  105.9% 
  PW, 0SP, 2ch  37.8% 0.0%  -4.8%  18.1%  42.7% 6.2%  1,990.8  88.2% 
  PW, 33SP, 2ch  37.8% 0.0%  -4.8%  18.1%  42.7% 6.2%  1,990.8  88.2% 
  Pen, 33Pen  38.1% 0.0%  -2.3% 0.0%  57.9% 6.3%  1,418.1  88.0% 
Source: EUROMOD 
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Figure 1a. 
BENELUX - Single, 1998




































approx. "Average Production Worker"
 
Source: EUROMOD  
 
Figure 1b. 
BENELUX - Single Parent, 1998




































Source: EUROMOD   26
Figure 1c. 
BENELUX - Married Single Earner Couple, 2 Children, 1998

































Source: EUROMOD  
 
Figure 1d. 
BENELUX - Married Couple, Wife’s Earnings are 33% of Husband’s, 2 Children, 1998

































Source: EUROMOD   27
Figure 1e. 
BENELUX - Pensioner Couple, 1998

































Source: EUROMOD   28
Figure 2a. 
 








Source: EUROMOD   31
Figure 2d. 
 
Source: EUROMOD   32
Figure 2e. 
 
Source: EUROMOD   33
Figure 3a. 
 








Source: EUROMOD   36
Figure 3d. 
 




Note: The lowest original income here is about 1,100 Euro since all Dutch residents past the age of 65 are entitled to a flat rate state pension (included in original income). See 
table 1a.  38
Figure 4a. 
 




Note: The lowest original income here is 300 Euro since for this household type we assume maintenance income (included in original income) of 150 Euro per child (see table 
1a).   40
Figure 4c. 
 
Source: EUROMOD   41
Figure 4d. 
 
Source: EUROMOD   42
Figure 4e. 
 
Source: EUROMOD 